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PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL 
84-3040 
I. Plaintiff does not, of course, argue with the 
proposition that an adequate supersedeas bond will secure and 
stay the money judgment in this case. She believes the Court 
should require such a bond in an amount sufficient to cover 
backpay and attorneys' fees -- $793,635.32 -- plus interest (see 
28 u.s.c. §1961) on that amount for at least two years. There is 
a better than even chance that appellate proceedings in this case 
would take more than one year to complete. 11 Having offered 
testimony that its future is much bleaker than plaintiff's expert 
believed, Price Waterhouse is in a poor position to suggest that 
it should be excused from providing the full security of a 
supersedeas bond. 
y Assuming 10% interest per year, the bond amount would be $961,000. On the same reasoning, if the Court were to stay injunctive relief, the supersedeas bond should also secure at least two years of differential between plaintiff's earnings at the World Bank and her foregone earnings as a partner at Price Waterhouse, as projected by Prof. ,Tryon, i.e. $202,000 ($427,733 less $225,812; see Pl. Ex. A-3), plus two years of statutory interest on that amount. 
II. Moreover, defendant's motion to stay injunctive relief 
is without merit and should be denied. The law and equities do 
not support a stay, for they are quite opposite to what defendant 
claims: (1) Defendant is unlikely to prevail on the merits; (2) 
it cannot plausibly show a threat of irreparable injury, and this 
alone is fatal to its stay motfon; (3) plaintiff, on the other 
hand, would be clearly and irreparably injured by a prolonged 
stay of the relief she has sought for more than six years; (4) 
contrary to defendant's view, there is a public interest, which 
strongly opposes its stay motion. 
DISCUSSION 
A. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
Without doubt, in this case defendant should have to show a 
strong likelihood of success on the merits, because the equities 
do not support its motion. Therefore, the variant of the 
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. Federal Power 
Commission, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958) test put forth in 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. Holiday Tours, 
Inc., 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1977), has no application here, and 
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers requires denial of the stay motion. 
See also Hilton v. Braunskill, U.S. , 107 s. ct. 2113, 
2119 (1987). Moreover, it is fatal to the motion that defendant 
does not and cannot show irreparable harm, which is the 
indispensable predicate for a stay. See Wisconsin Gas Co. v. 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. 
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Cir. 1985). In truth, on this point the motion merely restates 
points to which the Court gave careful consideration in its May 
14, 1990 decision. 
B. THE FOUR FACTORS APPLIED 
1) The Merits 
Defendant does not argue that it is likely to prevail on the 
merits or even that this Court's liability decision on remand 
poses a "serious" or "difficult legal question." Holiday Tours, 
559 F.2d at 844-845 requires, at a minimum, that such a question 
be presented in conjunction with strong equities in order to 
justify a stay. 
The "difficult legal question" claimed by defendant is the 
order that plaintiff be made a partner (principal) in Price 
Waterhouse effective July 1, 1990. But this is a claim founded 
on semantic confusion, because the Court in its May 14 decision 
found "ample authority" in the reasoning of Hishon v. King & 
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) to order partnership, Y but 
described as a "difficult and unresolved issue" whether it should 
exercise its discretion in this case by doing so (May 14, 1990 
Mern. 16). By analogy a trial judge might describe as "difficult" 
a sentencing decision which presented no appealable legal 
]J On June 18, 1990, the Supr8me Court declined to review 
the First Circuit's approval of an order requiring a university 
to grant tenure to a successful Title VII plaintiff. Trustees of 
Boston University v. Brown, 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___ , 58 Law Week 3796 (June 19, 1990, No. 89-
1680). The grant of academic tenure is at least as invasive of 
traditional collegial decisionrnaking as the grant of partnership 
in a large nationwide business firm with nearly 1,000 partners. 
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issue. 
Deciding whether a partnership should be required to admit a 
partner to remedy a Title VII violation may well constitute a 
difficult exercise of discretion for a district judge. But once 
discretion has been exercised, the question on appeal is whether 
it has been abused -- and defe~dant has not even begun to explain 
how it would argue that this Court's careful weighing of the 
competing factors was an abuse of discretion. 
There is little doubt how the Court of Appeals will view the 
equitable relief granted to plaintiff, for it has already spoken 
to that. Repeatedly in its 1987 opinion the majority noted its 
expectation that this Court would have ordered partnership for 
plaintiff if it had found a constructive discharge following the 
original trial. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 461, 464-
465, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1987). That may have been dictum, but it 
clearly reflects the fact that the appeals court had no doubt as 
to legal power. Moreover, the Court of Appeals' unanimous ruling 
that the failure to repropose plaintiff for partnership in 1984 
"would have been viewed by any reasonable senior manager in her 
position as a career-ending action," id. at 473, confirms the 
propriety of the relief now granted. 
As to the possible claim of abuse of discretion, this Court 
has found that alternative remedy of front pay will not make 
plaintiff whole and also might not provide a sufficient deterrent 
against future discrimination by defendant . May 14, 1990 Mem. 
19. Defendant has not, and cannot, suggest any flaws in the 
Court's approach. 
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There is, in short, no s .erious legal question as to his 
Court's power to order partnership and no likelihood that 
defendant will prevail on appeal if it challenges either that 
power or its exercise here. The nineteenth and early twentieth 
century cases which it cites in its motion primarily concerned 
small non-institutionalized partnerships and long predated the 
enactment of Title VII and the decision in Hishon. 
2} Injury to Defendant 
Defendant's claim of irreparable injury is nebulous, and its 
attempt to support that claim can best be described as 
perfunctory. This Court carefully considered the relevant 
equitable considerations at pages 17 to 19 of its May 14, 1990 
decision. Without doubt "a strained partnership relationship" 
(Def. Mot. 4) has occurred before and will occur again within a 
firm of more than 900 partners. As a new partner, however, 
plaintiff will have no say in the management of the firm during 
the next two years. Her skills and professional competence, as 
the Court has noted, are not seriously questioned. She has in 
the past done more than her share to enhance Price Waterhouse's 
business and income. There is not the slightest reason to think 
she will (or could} harm its reputation. 
Finally, there will be no "eggs that could not be 
unscrambled" even if defendant were to prevail on appeal. The 
record shows that Price Waterhouse gains and loses partners every 
year without difficulty. 
Defendant's failure to demonstrate irreparable injury is, by 
itself, fatal to the pending motion. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers 
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established that such a showing is indispensable to the success 
of a stay motion, and Wisconsin Gas Co. v. F.E.R.C., supra, 
underscored the point by rejecting stay motions on this ground 
alone. In doing so, it described "several well known and 
indisputable principles," 758 F.2d at 674, which guide courts in 
assessing claims of irreparable injury: 
First, the injury nrust be both certain arrl great; it 
nrust be actual arrl not theoretical. Injunctive relief 
"will not be granted against sanething marely feared 
as liable to occur at sane irrlefinite time," 
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 674, 51 
S.ct. 286, 291, 75 L.F.d. 602 (1931); the party seeking 
injunctive relief must show that "[t]he injury 
complained of [is] of such i.nminence that there is a 
'clear arrl present' need for equitable relief to 
prevent irreparable hann." Ashlarrl Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 
409 F.SUpp. 297, 307 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 548 F.2d 977 
(D.C.Cir. 1976) (citations arrl internal quotations 
omitted). 
It is also well settled that economic loss does 
not, in arrl of itself, constitute irreparable hann. 
As this court has noted: 
'!he key word in this consideration is 
irreparable. Mere injuries, however 
substantial, in terns of rroney, time arrl 
energy necessarily experrled in the absence of 
a stay are not enough. '!he possibility that 
adequate carrpensatocy or other corrective 
relief will be available at a later date, in 
the ordinary course of litigation weighs 
heavily against a claim of irreparable hann. 
Virginia Petroletnn Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d at 
925. Recoverable rronetacy loss may constitute 
irreparable hann only where the loss threatens the 
vecy existence of the irovant' s tusiness. See 
Washirgton Metrqx:>litan Area Transit Cornm'nv. Holiday 
Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 n.2 (D.C.Cir. 1977). 
Implicit in each of these principles is the 
further requirerrent that the novant substantiate the 
claim that irreparable injury is "likelY" to occur. 
See Washirgton Metrqx:>litan Area Transit Cornm'n v. 
Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.?d at 843 n.3 Bare 
allegations of what is likely to occur are of no value 
since the court nrust decide whether the hann will in 
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fact occur. 'Ihe m:ivant nust provide proof that the 
hann has cx::cur:red in the past arrl is likely to occur 
again, or proof i.rxlicatinJ that the hann is certain to 
cx::cur in the near future. F\Jrther, the novant must 
shc:M that the alleged hann will directly result from 
the action which the novant seeks to enjoin. 
Id; emphasis by the court. We recognize that defendant 
principally raises a claim of non-economic injury here; but it 
neither defines that injury nor substantiates its likelihood. 
3) Injury to Plaintiff 
The one clear victim of irreparable injury would be the 
plaintiff if a stay were to be granted. She first joined Price 
Waterhouse in 1978, when she was 34 years old. She is now 46. 
She has already lost seven irreplaceable years of partnership 
practice and progression. The normal retirement age at Price 
Waterhouse is 60. Institutions pass through time with no 
necessary losses; adult human beings do not. 
A stay would almost certainly entail an additional year or 
more of delay in the time when plaintiff would be admitted to 
partnership. That is an unwarranted and harsh added penalty 
which cannot be justified in this case by any of the other three 
relevant factors -- especially since defendant has not 
demonstrated any likelihood that it will ultimately prevail. 
(4) The Public Interest 
Defendant's claim that a stay would not "implicate" the 
public interest (Def.Mot.5, note 5) is mistaken. This case has 
been widely reported, and plaintiff's success has been seen as a 
vindication of Title VII's ability to reach and remedy the 
subtler forms of discrimination which frequently characterize 
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professional employment and which have often placed a "glass 
ceiling" above women and minority professionals. 
It would be profoundly disturbing to other victims of such 
discrimination to see that an employer such as Price Waterhouse 
could postpone relief on the basis of the arguments made here and 
reliance on ancient notions about partnerships formed in an era 
when professional firms were commonly small, local, and highly 
personal. 
Title VII cases commonly pit a single individual against an 
institutional employer with far greater resources. To imply that 
the slimmest chance of appellate success -- with no plausible 
claim of serious injury -- will suffice to postpone relief for a 
year or more after final judgment cannot help but signal other 
employees that they must be prepared for a war of attrition if 
they sue under Title VII. 
Conversely, the law's purposes are served if there is no 




Defendant's motion for a stay of equitable relief should be 
denied. It should also be required to put up a sufficient 
supersedeas bond to secure in full the money judgment, including 
interest, for a period of two years. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER 
1275 K Street, N.W. 
Suite 950 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 898-4800 
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Upon consideration of defendant's motion for a stay pending 
appeal, it is hereby 
ORDERED, as follows: 
(1) The motion is granted as to the money judgment, 
including attorneys' fees, provided that defendant files within 
five days a supersedeas bond with a proper surety in the amount 
of$ 961,000; and 
(2) Defendant's motion is denied in all other respects. 
Date: June --' 1990 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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